fix(security): A-3 auth middleware coverage fixes
Fixes 9 auth middleware findings from the A-3 recon audit. F-A3-11 CRITICAL: Removed JWT secret from WebAuthMiddleware log output. Replaced emoji-prefixed fmt.Printf with ETHOS-compliant log.Printf. No secret values in any log output. F-A3-7 CRITICAL: Config download now requires WebAuthMiddleware. GET /downloads/config/:agent_id is admin-only (agents never call it). F-A3-6 HIGH: Update package download now requires AuthMiddleware. GET /downloads/updates/:package_id requires valid agent JWT. F-A3-10 HIGH: Scheduler stats changed from AuthMiddleware to WebAuthMiddleware. Agent JWTs can no longer view scheduler internals. F-A3-13 LOW: RequireAdmin() middleware implemented. 7 security settings routes re-enabled (GET/PUT/POST under /security/settings). security_settings.go.broken renamed to .go, API mismatches fixed. F-A3-12 MEDIUM: JWT issuer claims added for token type separation. Agent tokens: issuer=redflag-agent, Web tokens: issuer=redflag-web. AuthMiddleware rejects tokens with wrong issuer. Grace period: tokens with no issuer still accepted (backward compat). F-A3-2 MEDIUM: /auth/verify now has WebAuthMiddleware applied. Endpoint returns 200 with valid=true for valid admin tokens. F-A3-9 MEDIUM: Agent self-unregister (DELETE /:id) now rate-limited using the same agent_reports rate limiter as other agent routes. F-A3-14 LOW: CORS origin configurable via REDFLAG_CORS_ORIGIN env var. Defaults to http://localhost:3000 for development. Added PATCH method and agent-specific headers to CORS config. All 27 server tests pass. All 14 agent tests pass. No regressions. See docs/A3_Fix_Implementation.md and docs/Deviations_Report.md (DEV-020 through DEV-022). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -198,3 +198,37 @@ This document records deviations from the implementation spec.
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**Issue found during A2 verification:** The `queries.RetryCommand` function (commands.go:200) still exists but is no longer called by any handler. Both `UpdateHandler.RetryCommand` and `UnifiedUpdateHandler.RetryCommand` now build the command inline and call `signAndCreateCommand`. The function is dead code.
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**Action:** Not removed in this pass (verification scope is "fix what is broken", not refactor). Flagged for future cleanup.
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## DEV-020: security_settings.go handler API mismatches fixed (A-3)
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**Issue:** The `security_settings.go.broken` handler was written against a different version of the `SecuritySettingsService` API. Methods `GetAllSettings(userID)`, `GetSettingsByCategory(userID, category)`, `GetAuditTrail()`, `GetSecurityOverview()`, and `ApplySettingsBatch()` either had wrong signatures or didn't exist.
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**Fix:** Rewrote handler methods to match the actual service API. `GetAuditTrail` and `GetSecurityOverview` return placeholder responses since those methods aren't implemented in the service yet. `ApplySettingsBatch` replaced with iterative `SetSetting` calls. `userID` string-to-UUID conversion added.
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**Impact:** 7 security settings routes are now functional and protected by WebAuthMiddleware + RequireAdmin.
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## DEV-021: Config download endpoint returns template, not secrets (A-3)
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**Spec says (F-A3-7):** "Agent config files may contain server URLs, registration tokens, or other secrets."
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**Actual finding:** The `HandleConfigDownload` handler returns a config **template** with placeholder credentials (zero UUID, empty tokens). No actual secrets are served. The install script fills in real credentials locally.
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**Action:** Protected with WebAuthMiddleware anyway (ETHOS #2 compliance). Agents never call this endpoint (confirmed via grep). Only the admin dashboard uses it.
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**Impact:** No operational change for agents. Dashboard users need to be logged in.
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## DEV-022: Issuer grace period for backward compat (A-3)
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**Issue:** Adding issuer validation to JWT middleware would immediately invalidate all existing deployed agent tokens (which have no issuer claim).
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**Solution:** Tokens with empty/absent issuer are allowed through with a logged warning. Tokens with a WRONG issuer (e.g., `redflag-web` on agent middleware) are rejected immediately. This provides a migration path: new tokens have issuers, old tokens work during the grace period.
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**TODO:** Remove issuer-absent grace period after 30 days from deployment. At that point, all deployed agents will have rotated their tokens (24h expiry).
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**Impact:** Cross-type token confusion is blocked for new tokens. Old tokens degrade gracefully.
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