Files
Redflag/aggregator-server/internal/api/middleware/token_confusion_test.go
jpetree331 4c62de8d8b fix(security): A-3 auth middleware coverage fixes
Fixes 9 auth middleware findings from the A-3 recon audit.

F-A3-11 CRITICAL: Removed JWT secret from WebAuthMiddleware log output.
  Replaced emoji-prefixed fmt.Printf with ETHOS-compliant log.Printf.
  No secret values in any log output.

F-A3-7 CRITICAL: Config download now requires WebAuthMiddleware.
  GET /downloads/config/:agent_id is admin-only (agents never call it).

F-A3-6 HIGH: Update package download now requires AuthMiddleware.
  GET /downloads/updates/:package_id requires valid agent JWT.

F-A3-10 HIGH: Scheduler stats changed from AuthMiddleware to
  WebAuthMiddleware. Agent JWTs can no longer view scheduler internals.

F-A3-13 LOW: RequireAdmin() middleware implemented. 7 security settings
  routes re-enabled (GET/PUT/POST under /security/settings).
  security_settings.go.broken renamed to .go, API mismatches fixed.

F-A3-12 MEDIUM: JWT issuer claims added for token type separation.
  Agent tokens: issuer=redflag-agent, Web tokens: issuer=redflag-web.
  AuthMiddleware rejects tokens with wrong issuer.
  Grace period: tokens with no issuer still accepted (backward compat).

F-A3-2 MEDIUM: /auth/verify now has WebAuthMiddleware applied.
  Endpoint returns 200 with valid=true for valid admin tokens.

F-A3-9 MEDIUM: Agent self-unregister (DELETE /:id) now rate-limited
  using the same agent_reports rate limiter as other agent routes.

F-A3-14 LOW: CORS origin configurable via REDFLAG_CORS_ORIGIN env var.
  Defaults to http://localhost:3000 for development.
  Added PATCH method and agent-specific headers to CORS config.

All 27 server tests pass. All 14 agent tests pass. No regressions.
See docs/A3_Fix_Implementation.md and docs/Deviations_Report.md
(DEV-020 through DEV-022).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 22:17:40 -04:00

145 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package middleware_test
// token_confusion_test.go — Pre-fix tests for cross-type JWT token confusion.
//
// BUG F-A3-12 MEDIUM: Agent and web JWTs share the same signing secret with
// no issuer/audience differentiation. Cross-type token confusion is possible.
//
// The shared secret is set at main.go:166. Both AuthMiddleware (agent JWT)
// and WebAuthMiddleware (admin JWT) use the same HMAC key. Without issuer
// or audience claims, a JWT valid for one context may pass signature
// validation in the other.
//
// Run: cd aggregator-server && go test ./internal/api/middleware/... -v -run TestToken
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag/aggregator-server/internal/api/handlers"
"github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag/aggregator-server/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
// makeWebJWT creates a valid web/admin JWT with correct issuer for testing
func makeWebJWT(t *testing.T, secret string) string {
t.Helper()
claims := handlers.UserClaims{
UserID: "1",
Username: "admin",
Role: "admin",
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Issuer: "redflag-web",
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
},
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
signed, err := token.SignedString([]byte(secret))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to sign web JWT: %v", err)
}
return signed
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test 4.1 — Web token SHOULD be rejected by agent AuthMiddleware
//
// Category: Verify actual behavior — PASS or FAIL depending on claims parsing
//
// BUG F-A3-12: Shared JWT secret allows cross-type token use. A web token
// passes signature validation on agent middleware. The question is whether
// claims parsing (AgentClaims expecting AgentID uuid.UUID) rejects the
// web token that has UserID string instead.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestWebTokenRejectedByAgentAuthMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
// POST-FIX (F-A3-12): Web token with issuer=redflag-web is rejected by
// agent AuthMiddleware which validates issuer=redflag-agent.
sharedSecret := "shared-secret-confusion-test"
middleware.JWTSecret = sharedSecret
router := gin.New()
router.Use(middleware.AuthMiddleware())
router.GET("/agent-route", func(c *gin.Context) {
agentID, exists := c.Get("agent_id")
if !exists {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "no agent_id"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"agent_id": agentID})
})
// Web JWT with issuer=redflag-web
webToken := makeWebJWT(t, sharedSecret)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/agent-route", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+webToken)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized && rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] web JWT accepted by agent AuthMiddleware (got %d, expected 401)", rec.Code)
}
t.Logf("[INFO] [server] [auth] F-A3-12 FIXED: web JWT rejected by agent middleware (%d)", rec.Code)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test 4.2 — Agent token SHOULD be rejected by WebAuthMiddleware
//
// Category: Verify actual behavior — PASS or FAIL depending on claims parsing
//
// BUG F-A3-12: An agent token (AgentClaims with AgentID uuid.UUID) may pass
// signature validation on WebAuthMiddleware. The question is whether the
// UserClaims parsing rejects it.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestAgentTokenRejectedByWebAuthMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
// POST-FIX (F-A3-12): Agent token with issuer=redflag-agent is rejected by
// WebAuthMiddleware which validates issuer=redflag-web.
sharedSecret := "shared-secret-confusion-test-2"
middleware.JWTSecret = sharedSecret
authHandler := handlers.NewAuthHandler(sharedSecret, nil)
router := gin.New()
router.Use(authHandler.WebAuthMiddleware())
router.GET("/admin-route", func(c *gin.Context) {
userID, exists := c.Get("user_id")
if !exists {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "no user_id"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"user_id": userID})
})
// Agent JWT with issuer=redflag-agent
agentClaims := middleware.AgentClaims{
AgentID: uuid.New(),
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Issuer: middleware.JWTIssuerAgent,
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
},
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, agentClaims)
agentToken, err := token.SignedString([]byte(sharedSecret))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to sign agent JWT: %v", err)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/admin-route", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+agentToken)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized && rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] agent JWT accepted by WebAuthMiddleware (got %d, expected 401)", rec.Code)
}
t.Logf("[INFO] [server] [auth] F-A3-12 FIXED: agent JWT rejected by web middleware (%d)", rec.Code)
}