jpetree331
f97d4845af
Complete RedFlag codebase with two major security audit implementations.
== A-1: Ed25519 Key Rotation Support ==
Server:
- SignCommand sets SignedAt timestamp and KeyID on every signature
- signing_keys database table (migration 020) for multi-key rotation
- InitializePrimaryKey registers active key at startup
- /api/v1/public-keys endpoint for rotation-aware agents
- SigningKeyQueries for key lifecycle management
Agent:
- Key-ID-aware verification via CheckKeyRotation
- FetchAndCacheAllActiveKeys for rotation pre-caching
- Cache metadata with TTL and staleness fallback
- SecurityLogger events for key rotation and command signing
== A-2: Replay Attack Fixes (F-1 through F-7) ==
F-5 CRITICAL - RetryCommand now signs via signAndCreateCommand
F-1 HIGH - v3 format: "{agent_id}:{cmd_id}:{type}:{hash}:{ts}"
F-7 HIGH - Migration 026: expires_at column with partial index
F-6 HIGH - GetPendingCommands/GetStuckCommands filter by expires_at
F-2 HIGH - Agent-side executedIDs dedup map with cleanup
F-4 HIGH - commandMaxAge reduced from 24h to 4h
F-3 CRITICAL - Old-format commands rejected after 48h via CreatedAt
Verification fixes: migration idempotency (ETHOS #4), log format
compliance (ETHOS #1), stale comments updated.
All 24 tests passing. Docker --no-cache build verified.
See docs/ for full audit reports and deviation log (DEV-001 to DEV-019).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
91 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
91 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
package services
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/ed25519"
|
|
"encoding/base64"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"time"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type UpdateNonce struct {
|
|
AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
|
|
TargetVersion string `json:"target_version"`
|
|
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"`
|
|
Signature string `json:"signature"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type UpdateNonceService struct {
|
|
privateKey ed25519.PrivateKey
|
|
maxAge time.Duration
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func NewUpdateNonceService(privateKey ed25519.PrivateKey) *UpdateNonceService {
|
|
return &UpdateNonceService{
|
|
privateKey: privateKey,
|
|
maxAge: 10 * time.Minute,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate creates a signed nonce authorizing an agent to update
|
|
func (s *UpdateNonceService) Generate(agentID, targetVersion string) (string, error) {
|
|
nonce := UpdateNonce{
|
|
AgentID: agentID,
|
|
TargetVersion: targetVersion,
|
|
Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data, err := json.Marshal(nonce)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("marshal failed: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signature := ed25519.Sign(s.privateKey, data)
|
|
nonce.Signature = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
|
|
encoded, err := json.Marshal(nonce)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("encode failed: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(encoded), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate verifies the nonce signature and freshness
|
|
func (s *UpdateNonceService) Validate(encodedNonce string) (*UpdateNonce, error) {
|
|
data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encodedNonce)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid base64: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var nonce UpdateNonce
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &nonce); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid format: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check freshness
|
|
if time.Now().Unix()-nonce.Timestamp > int64(s.maxAge.Seconds()) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("nonce expired")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify signature
|
|
signature, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(nonce.Signature)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Remove signature for verification
|
|
nonce.Signature = ""
|
|
verifyData, err := json.Marshal(nonce)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal verify data: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !ed25519.Verify(s.privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), verifyData, signature) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Return validated nonce
|
|
return &nonce, nil
|
|
}
|