Pre-fix test suite documenting 8 auth middleware bugs found during the A-3 recon audit. Tests are written to FAIL where they assert correct post-fix behavior, and PASS where they document current buggy behavior. No bugs are fixed in this commit. Tests added: - F-A3-11 CRITICAL: WebAuthMiddleware leaks JWT secret to stdout (3 tests: secret in output, emoji in output, ETHOS format) - F-A3-7 CRITICAL: Config download requires no auth (2 tests) - F-A3-6 HIGH: Update package download requires no auth (2 tests) - F-A3-10 HIGH: Scheduler stats accepts agent JWT (2 tests) - F-A3-12 MEDIUM: Cross-type JWT token confusion (2 tests) - F-A3-2 MEDIUM: /auth/verify dead endpoint (2 tests) - F-A3-13 LOW: RequireAdmin middleware missing (1 test + 1 build-tagged) - F-A3-9 MEDIUM: Agent self-unregister no rate limit (2 tests) Current state: 10 FAIL, 7 PASS, 1 SKIP (build-tagged), 1 unchanged See docs/A3_PreFix_Tests.md for full inventory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
212 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
212 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
package handlers_test
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// auth_middleware_leak_test.go — Pre-fix tests for JWT secret leak in WebAuthMiddleware.
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//
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// BUG F-A3-11 CRITICAL: WebAuthMiddleware (auth.go:128) prints the JWT signing
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// secret to stdout on every validation failure:
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// fmt.Printf("🔓 JWT validation failed: %v (secret: %s)\n", err, h.jwtSecret)
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//
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// Violations:
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// 1. Secret in log output — any log collector captures the signing key
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// 2. Emoji in log output — violates ETHOS #1 log format requirement
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// 3. Log format wrong — must be [TAG] [system] [component] per ETHOS #1
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//
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// Tests 1.1-1.3 currently FAIL (bug present). They will PASS after the fix.
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//
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// Run: cd aggregator-server && go test ./internal/api/handlers/... -v -run TestWebAuthMiddleware
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import (
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"bytes"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag/aggregator-server/internal/api/handlers"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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)
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func init() {
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gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test 1.1 — WebAuthMiddleware does NOT log the JWT secret
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//
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// Category: FAIL-NOW / PASS-AFTER-FIX
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//
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// BUG F-A3-11: auth.go:128 prints h.jwtSecret directly to stdout.
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// Any log collector (Docker logs, journald, CloudWatch) captures this secret.
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// An attacker with log access can forge arbitrary admin tokens.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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func TestWebAuthMiddlewareDoesNotLogSecret(t *testing.T) {
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testSecret := "test-secret-12345"
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authHandler := handlers.NewAuthHandler(testSecret, nil)
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router := gin.New()
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router.Use(authHandler.WebAuthMiddleware())
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router.GET("/test", func(c *gin.Context) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
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})
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// Capture stdout during middleware execution
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oldStdout := os.Stdout
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r, w, err := os.Pipe()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to create pipe: %v", err)
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}
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os.Stdout = w
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// Send request with an invalid JWT (valid format, wrong signature)
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjoiMSJ9.invalidsig")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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w.Close()
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os.Stdout = oldStdout
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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io.Copy(&buf, r)
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captured := buf.String()
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// The secret MUST NOT appear in stdout
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if strings.Contains(captured, testSecret) {
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t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] WebAuthMiddleware leaked JWT secret to stdout.\n"+
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"BUG F-A3-11: auth.go:128 prints h.jwtSecret on validation failure.\n"+
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"Captured output contains: %q\n"+
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"After fix: remove secret from log output entirely.", testSecret)
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}
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// Confirm the request was still rejected
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if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] expected 401 for invalid token, got %d", rec.Code)
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test 1.2 — WebAuthMiddleware log output has no emoji characters
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//
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// Category: FAIL-NOW / PASS-AFTER-FIX
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//
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// BUG F-A3-11: auth.go:128 uses "🔓" (U+1F513) in log output.
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// ETHOS #1 requires [TAG] [system] [component] format, no emojis.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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func TestWebAuthMiddlewareLogFormatHasNoEmoji(t *testing.T) {
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authHandler := handlers.NewAuthHandler("emoji-test-secret", nil)
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router := gin.New()
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router.Use(authHandler.WebAuthMiddleware())
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router.GET("/test", func(c *gin.Context) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
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})
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oldStdout := os.Stdout
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r, w, _ := os.Pipe()
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os.Stdout = w
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer invalid-token")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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w.Close()
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os.Stdout = oldStdout
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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io.Copy(&buf, r)
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captured := buf.String()
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// Check for emoji characters (Unicode symbols above U+1F300)
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hasEmoji := false
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for _, ch := range captured {
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if ch >= 0x1F300 || (ch >= 0x2600 && ch <= 0x27BF) {
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hasEmoji = true
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t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] emoji character found in log output: U+%04X\n"+
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"BUG F-A3-11: auth.go:128 uses emoji in log. ETHOS #1 violation.\n"+
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"After fix: use [WARNING] [server] [auth] format.", ch)
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break
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}
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}
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// Also check for the specific emoji used
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if strings.Contains(captured, "\U0001F513") {
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if !hasEmoji {
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t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] lock emoji U+1F513 found in log output")
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}
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}
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// Check that the word "secret" does not appear
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if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(captured), "secret") {
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t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] word 'secret' found in log output")
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}
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_ = rec // ensure request completed
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test 1.3 — WebAuthMiddleware log format is ETHOS-compliant
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//
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// Category: FAIL-NOW / PASS-AFTER-FIX
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//
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// BUG F-A3-11: Log format must be [TAG] [system] [component] message.
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// Current output: "🔓 JWT validation failed: ... (secret: ...)"
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// Expected: "[WARNING] [server] [auth] jwt_validation_failed error=..."
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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func TestWebAuthMiddlewareLogFormatCompliant(t *testing.T) {
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authHandler := handlers.NewAuthHandler("format-test-secret", nil)
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router := gin.New()
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router.Use(authHandler.WebAuthMiddleware())
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router.GET("/test", func(c *gin.Context) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
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})
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oldStdout := os.Stdout
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r, w, _ := os.Pipe()
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os.Stdout = w
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer invalid-jwt-token")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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w.Close()
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os.Stdout = oldStdout
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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io.Copy(&buf, r)
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captured := buf.String()
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if captured == "" {
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// No output is acceptable (middleware can log to logger instead of stdout)
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t.Log("[INFO] [server] [auth] no stdout output produced (acceptable)")
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return
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}
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// If output exists, it must follow ETHOS format
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lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(captured), "\n")
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for _, line := range lines {
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line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
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if line == "" {
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continue
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}
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// Must start with [TAG] pattern
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if !strings.HasPrefix(line, "[") {
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t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] log line does not follow [TAG] format: %q\n"+
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"BUG F-A3-11: expected [WARNING] [server] [auth] or [ERROR] [server] [auth]", line)
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}
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// Must not contain the secret
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if strings.Contains(line, "format-test-secret") {
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t.Errorf("[ERROR] [server] [auth] log line contains JWT secret")
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}
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}
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_ = rec
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}
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