Fixes 9 auth middleware findings from the A-3 recon audit. F-A3-11 CRITICAL: Removed JWT secret from WebAuthMiddleware log output. Replaced emoji-prefixed fmt.Printf with ETHOS-compliant log.Printf. No secret values in any log output. F-A3-7 CRITICAL: Config download now requires WebAuthMiddleware. GET /downloads/config/:agent_id is admin-only (agents never call it). F-A3-6 HIGH: Update package download now requires AuthMiddleware. GET /downloads/updates/:package_id requires valid agent JWT. F-A3-10 HIGH: Scheduler stats changed from AuthMiddleware to WebAuthMiddleware. Agent JWTs can no longer view scheduler internals. F-A3-13 LOW: RequireAdmin() middleware implemented. 7 security settings routes re-enabled (GET/PUT/POST under /security/settings). security_settings.go.broken renamed to .go, API mismatches fixed. F-A3-12 MEDIUM: JWT issuer claims added for token type separation. Agent tokens: issuer=redflag-agent, Web tokens: issuer=redflag-web. AuthMiddleware rejects tokens with wrong issuer. Grace period: tokens with no issuer still accepted (backward compat). F-A3-2 MEDIUM: /auth/verify now has WebAuthMiddleware applied. Endpoint returns 200 with valid=true for valid admin tokens. F-A3-9 MEDIUM: Agent self-unregister (DELETE /:id) now rate-limited using the same agent_reports rate limiter as other agent routes. F-A3-14 LOW: CORS origin configurable via REDFLAG_CORS_ORIGIN env var. Defaults to http://localhost:3000 for development. Added PATCH method and agent-specific headers to CORS config. All 27 server tests pass. All 14 agent tests pass. No regressions. See docs/A3_Fix_Implementation.md and docs/Deviations_Report.md (DEV-020 through DEV-022). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
155 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
155 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag/aggregator-server/internal/database/queries"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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)
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// AuthHandler handles authentication for the web dashboard
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type AuthHandler struct {
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jwtSecret string
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adminQueries *queries.AdminQueries
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}
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// NewAuthHandler creates a new auth handler
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func NewAuthHandler(jwtSecret string, adminQueries *queries.AdminQueries) *AuthHandler {
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return &AuthHandler{
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jwtSecret: jwtSecret,
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adminQueries: adminQueries,
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}
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}
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// LoginRequest represents a login request
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type LoginRequest struct {
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Username string `json:"username" binding:"required"`
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Password string `json:"password" binding:"required"`
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}
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// LoginResponse represents a login response
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type LoginResponse struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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User *queries.Admin `json:"user"`
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}
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// UserClaims represents JWT claims for web dashboard users
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type UserClaims struct {
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UserID string `json:"user_id"`
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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}
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// Login handles web dashboard login
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func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c *gin.Context) {
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var req LoginRequest
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if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid request format"})
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return
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}
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// Validate credentials against database hash
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admin, err := h.adminQueries.VerifyAdminCredentials(req.Username, req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid username or password"})
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return
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}
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// Create JWT token for web dashboard
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claims := UserClaims{
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UserID: fmt.Sprintf("%d", admin.ID),
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Username: admin.Username,
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Role: "admin", // Always admin for single-admin system
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Issuer: "redflag-web",
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)),
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
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},
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte(h.jwtSecret))
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if err != nil {
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c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed to create token"})
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, LoginResponse{
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Token: tokenString,
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User: admin,
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})
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}
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// VerifyToken handles token verification
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func (h *AuthHandler) VerifyToken(c *gin.Context) {
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// This is handled by middleware, but we can add additional verification here
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userID, exists := c.Get("user_id")
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if !exists {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"valid": false})
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
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"valid": true,
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"user_id": userID,
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})
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}
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// Logout handles logout (client-side token removal)
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func (h *AuthHandler) Logout(c *gin.Context) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"message": "logged out successfully"})
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}
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// WebAuthMiddleware validates JWT tokens from web dashboard
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func (h *AuthHandler) WebAuthMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
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return func(c *gin.Context) {
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authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
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if authHeader == "" {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "missing authorization header"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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tokenString := authHeader
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// Remove "Bearer " prefix if present
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if len(authHeader) > 7 && authHeader[:7] == "Bearer " {
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tokenString = authHeader[7:]
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}
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token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &UserClaims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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return []byte(h.jwtSecret), nil
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})
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if err != nil || !token.Valid {
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log.Printf("[WARNING] [server] [auth] jwt_validation_failed error=%q", err)
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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if claims, ok := token.Claims.(*UserClaims); ok {
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// F-A3-12: Validate issuer to prevent cross-type token confusion
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if claims.Issuer != "" && claims.Issuer != "redflag-web" {
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log.Printf("[WARNING] [server] [auth] wrong_token_issuer expected=redflag-web got=%s", claims.Issuer)
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token type"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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// TODO: remove issuer-absent grace period after 30 days
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if claims.Issuer == "" {
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log.Printf("[WARNING] [server] [auth] web_token_missing_issuer user_id=%s", claims.UserID)
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}
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c.Set("user_id", claims.UserID)
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c.Set("user_role", claims.Role)
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c.Next()
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} else {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token claims"})
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c.Abort()
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}
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}
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} |