Complete RedFlag codebase with two major security audit implementations.
== A-1: Ed25519 Key Rotation Support ==
Server:
- SignCommand sets SignedAt timestamp and KeyID on every signature
- signing_keys database table (migration 020) for multi-key rotation
- InitializePrimaryKey registers active key at startup
- /api/v1/public-keys endpoint for rotation-aware agents
- SigningKeyQueries for key lifecycle management
Agent:
- Key-ID-aware verification via CheckKeyRotation
- FetchAndCacheAllActiveKeys for rotation pre-caching
- Cache metadata with TTL and staleness fallback
- SecurityLogger events for key rotation and command signing
== A-2: Replay Attack Fixes (F-1 through F-7) ==
F-5 CRITICAL - RetryCommand now signs via signAndCreateCommand
F-1 HIGH - v3 format: "{agent_id}:{cmd_id}:{type}:{hash}:{ts}"
F-7 HIGH - Migration 026: expires_at column with partial index
F-6 HIGH - GetPendingCommands/GetStuckCommands filter by expires_at
F-2 HIGH - Agent-side executedIDs dedup map with cleanup
F-4 HIGH - commandMaxAge reduced from 24h to 4h
F-3 CRITICAL - Old-format commands rejected after 48h via CreatedAt
Verification fixes: migration idempotency (ETHOS #4), log format
compliance (ETHOS #1), stale comments updated.
All 24 tests passing. Docker --no-cache build verified.
See docs/ for full audit reports and deviation log (DEV-001 to DEV-019).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
246 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
246 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag/aggregator-server/internal/database/queries"
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"github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag/aggregator-server/internal/utils"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// MachineBindingMiddleware validates machine ID matches database record
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// This prevents agent impersonation via config file copying to different machines
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func MachineBindingMiddleware(agentQueries *queries.AgentQueries, minAgentVersion string) gin.HandlerFunc {
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return func(c *gin.Context) {
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// Skip if not authenticated (handled by auth middleware)
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agentIDVal, exists := c.Get("agent_id")
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if !exists {
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c.Next()
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return
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}
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agentID, ok := agentIDVal.(uuid.UUID)
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if !ok {
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] Invalid agent_id type in context")
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c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "invalid agent ID"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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// Get agent from database
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agent, err := agentQueries.GetAgentByID(agentID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] Agent %s not found: %v", agentID, err)
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "agent not found"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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// Check if agent is reporting an update completion
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reportedVersion := c.GetHeader("X-Agent-Version")
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updateNonce := c.GetHeader("X-Update-Nonce")
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if agent.IsUpdating && updateNonce != "" {
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// Validate the nonce first (proves server authorized this update)
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if agent.PublicKeyFingerprint == nil {
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log.Printf("[SECURITY] Agent %s has no public key fingerprint for nonce validation", agentID)
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "server public key not configured"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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if err := validateUpdateNonceMiddleware(updateNonce, *agent.PublicKeyFingerprint); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[SECURITY] Invalid update nonce for agent %s: %v", agentID, err)
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "invalid update nonce"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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// Check for downgrade attempt (security boundary)
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if !isVersionUpgrade(reportedVersion, agent.CurrentVersion) {
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log.Printf("[SECURITY] Downgrade attempt detected: agent %s %s → %s",
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agentID, agent.CurrentVersion, reportedVersion)
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "downgrade not allowed"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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// Valid upgrade - complete it in database
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go func() {
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if err := agentQueries.CompleteAgentUpdate(agentID.String(), reportedVersion); err != nil {
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log.Printf("[ERROR] Failed to complete agent update: %v", err)
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} else {
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log.Printf("[system] Agent %s updated: %s → %s", agentID, agent.CurrentVersion, reportedVersion)
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}
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}()
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// Allow this request through
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c.Next()
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return
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}
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// Check minimum version (hard cutoff for legacy de-support)
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if agent.CurrentVersion != "" && minAgentVersion != "" {
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if !utils.IsNewerOrEqualVersion(agent.CurrentVersion, minAgentVersion) {
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// Allow old agents to check in if they have pending update commands
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// This prevents deadlock where agent can't check in to receive the update
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if c.Request.Method == "GET" && strings.HasSuffix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/commands") {
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// Check if agent has pending update command
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hasPendingUpdate, err := agentQueries.HasPendingUpdateCommand(agentID.String())
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] Error checking pending updates for agent %s: %v", agentID, err)
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}
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if hasPendingUpdate {
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] Allowing old agent %s (%s) to check in for update delivery (v%s < v%s)",
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agent.Hostname, agentID, agent.CurrentVersion, minAgentVersion)
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c.Next()
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return
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}
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}
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] Agent %s version %s below minimum %s - rejecting",
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agent.Hostname, agent.CurrentVersion, minAgentVersion)
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c.JSON(http.StatusUpgradeRequired, gin.H{
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"error": "agent version too old - upgrade required for security",
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"current_version": agent.CurrentVersion,
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"minimum_version": minAgentVersion,
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"upgrade_instructions": "Please upgrade to the latest agent version and re-register",
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})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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}
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// Extract X-Machine-ID header
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reportedMachineID := c.GetHeader("X-Machine-ID")
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if reportedMachineID == "" {
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] Agent %s (%s) missing X-Machine-ID header",
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agent.Hostname, agentID)
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
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"error": "missing machine ID header - agent version too old or tampered",
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"hint": "Please upgrade to the latest agent version (v0.1.22+)",
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})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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// Validate machine ID matches database
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if agent.MachineID == nil {
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] Agent %s (%s) has no machine_id in database - legacy agent",
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agent.Hostname, agentID)
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
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"error": "agent not bound to machine - re-registration required",
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"hint": "This agent was registered before v0.1.22. Please re-register with a new registration token.",
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})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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if *agent.MachineID != reportedMachineID {
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] ⚠️ SECURITY ALERT: Agent %s (%s) machine ID mismatch! DB=%s, Reported=%s",
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agent.Hostname, agentID, *agent.MachineID, reportedMachineID)
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
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"error": "machine ID mismatch - config file copied to different machine",
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"hint": "Agent configuration is bound to the original machine. Please register this machine with a new registration token.",
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"security_note": "This prevents agent impersonation attacks",
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})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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// Machine ID validated - allow request
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log.Printf("[MachineBinding] ✓ Agent %s (%s) machine ID validated: %s",
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agent.Hostname, agentID, reportedMachineID[:16]+"...")
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c.Next()
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}
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}
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func validateUpdateNonceMiddleware(nonceB64, serverPublicKey string) error {
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// Decode base64 nonce
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data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(nonceB64)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid base64: %w", err)
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}
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// Parse JSON
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var nonce struct {
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AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
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TargetVersion string `json:"target_version"`
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Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"`
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Signature string `json:"signature"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &nonce); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid format: %w", err)
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}
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// Check freshness
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if time.Now().Unix()-nonce.Timestamp > 600 { // 10 minutes
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return fmt.Errorf("nonce expired (age: %d seconds)", time.Now().Unix()-nonce.Timestamp)
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}
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// Verify signature
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signature, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(nonce.Signature)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature encoding: %w", err)
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}
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// Parse server's public key
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pubKeyBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(serverPublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid server public key: %w", err)
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}
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// Remove signature for verification
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originalSig := nonce.Signature
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nonce.Signature = ""
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verifyData, err := json.Marshal(nonce)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("marshal verify data: %w", err)
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}
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if !ed25519.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(pubKeyBytes), verifyData, signature) {
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return fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed")
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}
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// Restore signature (not needed but good practice)
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nonce.Signature = originalSig
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return nil
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}
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func isVersionUpgrade(new, current string) bool {
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// Parse semantic versions
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newParts := strings.Split(new, ".")
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curParts := strings.Split(current, ".")
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// Convert to integers for comparison
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newMajor, _ := strconv.Atoi(newParts[0])
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newMinor, _ := strconv.Atoi(newParts[1])
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newPatch, _ := strconv.Atoi(newParts[2])
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curMajor, _ := strconv.Atoi(curParts[0])
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curMinor, _ := strconv.Atoi(curParts[1])
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curPatch, _ := strconv.Atoi(curParts[2])
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// Check if new > current (not equal, not less)
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if newMajor > curMajor {
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return true
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}
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if newMajor == curMajor && newMinor > curMinor {
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return true
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}
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if newMajor == curMajor && newMinor == curMinor && newPatch > curPatch {
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return true
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}
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return false // Equal or downgrade
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}
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