Complete RedFlag codebase with two major security audit implementations.
== A-1: Ed25519 Key Rotation Support ==
Server:
- SignCommand sets SignedAt timestamp and KeyID on every signature
- signing_keys database table (migration 020) for multi-key rotation
- InitializePrimaryKey registers active key at startup
- /api/v1/public-keys endpoint for rotation-aware agents
- SigningKeyQueries for key lifecycle management
Agent:
- Key-ID-aware verification via CheckKeyRotation
- FetchAndCacheAllActiveKeys for rotation pre-caching
- Cache metadata with TTL and staleness fallback
- SecurityLogger events for key rotation and command signing
== A-2: Replay Attack Fixes (F-1 through F-7) ==
F-5 CRITICAL - RetryCommand now signs via signAndCreateCommand
F-1 HIGH - v3 format: "{agent_id}:{cmd_id}:{type}:{hash}:{ts}"
F-7 HIGH - Migration 026: expires_at column with partial index
F-6 HIGH - GetPendingCommands/GetStuckCommands filter by expires_at
F-2 HIGH - Agent-side executedIDs dedup map with cleanup
F-4 HIGH - commandMaxAge reduced from 24h to 4h
F-3 CRITICAL - Old-format commands rejected after 48h via CreatedAt
Verification fixes: migration idempotency (ETHOS #4), log format
compliance (ETHOS #1), stale comments updated.
All 24 tests passing. Docker --no-cache build verified.
See docs/ for full audit reports and deviation log (DEV-001 to DEV-019).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
72 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
72 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// AgentClaims represents JWT claims for agent authentication
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type AgentClaims struct {
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AgentID uuid.UUID `json:"agent_id"`
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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}
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// JWTSecret is set by the server at initialization
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var JWTSecret string
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// GenerateAgentToken creates a new JWT token for an agent
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func GenerateAgentToken(agentID uuid.UUID) (string, error) {
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claims := AgentClaims{
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AgentID: agentID,
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)),
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
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},
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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return token.SignedString([]byte(JWTSecret))
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}
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// AuthMiddleware validates JWT tokens from agents
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func AuthMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
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return func(c *gin.Context) {
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authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
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if authHeader == "" {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "missing authorization header"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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tokenString := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")
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if tokenString == authHeader {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid authorization format"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &AgentClaims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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return []byte(JWTSecret), nil
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})
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if err != nil || !token.Valid {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token"})
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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if claims, ok := token.Claims.(*AgentClaims); ok {
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c.Set("agent_id", claims.AgentID)
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c.Next()
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} else {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid token claims"})
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c.Abort()
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}
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}
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}
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